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ally arise from the licensing statutes and the hearings by the respective
state insurance commissioners.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that no new duty has been imposed on the insurance
salesman by these recent decisions. The duty remains that of exercising
reasonable or ordinary care, whether it be imposed by the agency rela-
tionship or by a theory of holding out and reliance. The extension
of liability has resulted from determinations of what types of conduct
constitute reasonable or ordinary care.
In summary it might, therefore, be stated that the insurance sales-
man, be he an "agent" or a "broker," will be held to the standard 6f
skill and care practiced by other members of his class or the class to
which he holds himself out to belong. On the other hand, whether a
professional fiduciary duty will be imposed in the near future remains a
matter of conjecture.
WORTH A. FAUVER, JR.
Stopgap Measures to Preserve the Status Quo
Pending Comprehensive Zoning or Urban
Redevelopment Legislation
Men are saying today that property, like every other social institution,
has a social function to fulfill. Legislation which destroys the institu-
tion is one thing. Legislation which holds it true to its function is quite
another.*
One of the most crucial problems of the city planner is to preserve
the status quo of an area being planned for redevelopment. Under Title
1 of the 1949 Federal Housing Act,1 there are necessarily many time-con-
suming steps to be taken by a municipality before reaching the fruition of
an urban renewal program. The creation of an urban renewal agency;'
the designation of an area for redevelopment; the procurement of federal
government commitments and advances for surveys and plans; the study
of the designated area and formulation of a general plan (in the larger
* CARmozo, THE NATURE OF T=E JUDIcIAL PROCESS 87 (1941).
1. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §5 1441, 1451-60 (1958). This Act has spurred urban
redevelopment. Under it a city can condemn and buy slum sites, dear the land, and sell to a
private developer at a loss. The federal government bears two-thirds of the loss, the city
the rest.
2. E.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CIry OF CLEVELAND, 5 1.2801
(Supp. 1959).
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cities, a General Neighborhood Plan);' and the approval of the plan by
the city council, are usually prerequisites for obtaining federal funds for
condemnation purposes. Also, under the federal act more time is con-
sumed because no land may be acquired without a public hearing first
being held.4 Thus, it may be some time before a landowner in an area
designated for urban renewal will actually, if ever, have his property
taken under eminent domain.5
The particular way land situated in a proposed urban redevelopment
area is used prior to the formulation and adoption of a general or compre-
hensive plan will have an important affect on the success of the plan.
For if, as some courts have reasoned,' persons were allowed to construct
buildings in derogation of a plan, the details of which are being worked
out, then the purposes for which that plan is being formulated will be
defeated. Thus, the importance of maintaining the status quo is readily
seen. Caution must be used, however, to analyze each case on its own
merits. It is often undesirable, and it may be unconstitutional, to sacrifice
the rights of a property owner to a nascent development program.7 The
land owner's proposed use may be even more beneficial to society than
the use for which his property is designated in a government sponsored
plan. But the courts are not likely to substitute the landowner's standard
of public interest for that of the governing authority.'
The constitutional argument lies in the fact that a landowner is en-
titled to the beneficial use of his property. The public authority need
not compensate a landowner for a change in zoning laws which may af-
fect his land, but just compensation must be made for land taken under
eminent domain. Due process of law must be followed in both cases.
Thus, where a landowner's plans for his property comply with present
3. ". .. for urban renewal areas of such scope that the urban renewal activities therein may
have to be carried out in stages ...over an estimated period of not more than ten years."
63 Stat. 414 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1452(d) (1968).
4. 63 Star. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1958).
5. 'Any single small store-owner in an area that's marked for redevelopment can hold up
the works by himself for a year or two." Richard Steiner, Federal Urban Renewal Commis-
sioner, quoted in EDITORS OF FORTUNE, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 103 (1958).
6. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
7. "The General City Law of New York provides that city planning boards may file master
plans providing for the development of the city, and 'for the purpose of preserving the integrity
of such official map' no permits, as a general matter, will issue for building in the bed of any
street or highway laid out on the map; and this, despite the fact that the map may at all times
be modified and the proposed construcion may never be carried out. N.Y. General City Law,
McKinney, Consol. Laws of N.Y., c. 21, §§ 26-39 (Supp. 1949). This law empowers a
municipality to restrict the use of private property which it may at some future time decide
to take." United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. 339 U.S. 261, 274 n.9 (1950).
A similar law was declared unconstitutional in Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976
(1893). It imposed a restriction upon the use of land, because the property could not be
used for building purposes, except at the risk of the owner losing the cost of the building if
the land were taken under eminent domain in the future.
8. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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zoning and building laws and he is denied a building permit, he is likely
to claim that he has been denied the beneficial use of his property
without due process and without just compensation. In light of this
argument, unreasonably restricting the use of land by freezing the issu-
ance of building permits may, in effect, amount to a confiscation. The
time when the application for a building permit is made, and the rapidity
with which the urban plan or a comprehensive zoning program is being
developed, will often be decisive.
STOPGAP MEASURES
"Stopgap" or "interim" ordinances and resolutions are adopted with
the intention of preserving the status quo until plans are completed and
a subsequent ordinance can be enacted. These measures have been em-
ployed by city legislators in the past to protect contemplated permanent
zoning regulations.? By prohibiting the issuance of building permits,
such measures attempt to prevent the use or improvement of property
in a manner contrary to the uses designated in the proposed permanent
regulations. Building inspectors have attempted, even without the bene-
fit of stopgap measures, to accomplish the same results by administra-
tively denying building permits." However, this practice is usually con-
demned by the courts because the building inspector is purely an ad-
ministrative agent and must follow the literal provisions of existing zon-
ing regulations."
Municipalities today are attempting to maintain the status quo in
areas designated for redevelopment (but not yet under a general plan)
by employing methods similar to those taken to protect future zoning. A
comprehensive urban renewal plan does, of course, contain zoning regu-
lations as well as building standards.
In Hunter v. Adams," a most significant California case, mandamus
proceedings were instituted against the City of Monterey, its building
inspector, and members of the city council to compel the issuance of a
permit to build a motel on property within a proposed redevelopment
project area. The city council, at the request of the local urban renewal
agency had, twenty days prior to Hunter's application for the building
permit, passed a stopgap resolution which froze the issuance of building
permits for the construction of any new structure or for any major im-
provement on property located within the proposed redevelopment
9. See Annot., 136 A.LR. 844 (1942).
10. State ex rel Ice & Fuel Co. v. Krauzweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 166 NE. 228 (1929).
See also Bassichis v. Guion, No. 25386, Ohio Ct. App., Jan. 16, 1961.
11. E.g., Lee v. Board of Adjustment of City of Rocky Mount, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.B.2d
128 (1946); YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACnicE 177 (1948).
12. 180 Cal. App. 2d. 511 (1960).
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project area. The resolution was to remain in effect for more than one
year; its purpose was to preserve, temporarily, the status quo in the pro-
posed project area. The trial court discharged the alternative writ of
mandamus and denied the petition for a peremptory writ. In affirming
the trial court's judgment, the appellate court stated:
It is difficult for us to conceive how an intelligent integrated plan
can be formulated if, while it is under study and planning, the area is
in a constant state of flux with new building construction and improve-
ments and the resulting change in property values and appraisals.' 3
Stopgap measures illustrate the use of police power in protecting
proposed legislation and plans. The Hunter case is significant because
it shows the use of police power in that concept's broadest sense. In
holding that the city council had properly exercised police power au-
thority, the court effectively neutralized the facts most favorable to
the property owners. These facts are (1) that no tentative plan for re-
development of the project area had been completed and no public hear-
ing had been held on such plan; (2) that the plans and specifications
for the erection of the motel complied with existing building and zoning
requirements; (3) that the property owners had incurred great expenses
in preparing their plans and anticipated further expenses because of the
delay in carrying out their intentions; and (4) that the refusal of a per-
mit denied the property owners of the beneficial use of their property.
Police Power
Police power, so far as it relates to real property, is the power to regu-
late its use, and is negative and restraining in its character. 4 Control of
the use of land for public purposes by exercise of this power has been
manifested most significantly in zoning laws, a development of this
century. The courts are reluctant to define the scope of this power be-
cause new social developments, such as urban redevelopment programs,
require its expanded use. As stated by one court:
What was at one time regarded as an improper exercise of the police
power may now, because of changed living conditions, be recognized
as a legitimate exercise of that power. In brief, 'there is nothing
known to the law that keeps more in step with human progress than
does the exercise of this power.'15
In 1926, the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning was firmly
established by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company. 6 The Court deter-
13. Id. at 520.
14. See METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 71 (1955).
15. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484-85, 234 Pac. 381, 383 (1925).
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this case the Village of Euclid was represented by the Hon.
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mined that it was within the police power of an Ohio municipality to
zone as residential a long strip of land along a railroad line, the land
having been purchased for future industrial development. Zoning pro-
visions which excluded commercial buildings were held to be not so
arbitrary and unreasonable, and their relation to the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare was not so insignificant that they could be
held unconstitutional as a misuse of the police power authority.
Since Ambler Realty was decided, authorized legislative bodies have
been given more leeway by the courts in deciding what public needs are
to be served by social legislation. This was made clear in Berman v.
Parker,'7 a Supreme Court decision concerned with the constitutionality of
the 1945 Redevelopment Act"8 of the District of Columbia and the
validity of the District's Redevelopment Land Agency's taking of certain
property. The procedures involved the exercise of the police power, and
the enforcement by condemnation under eminent domain. The property
owners daimed that their property was not slum housing, and that its
appropriation would be for private, not public use.
To the latter argument, the Court pointed out that the private de-
velopers received the land subject to conditions prescribed by the urban
redevelopment plan. Rejecting the request of the owners to review the
legislative determinations upon which the development plan was based,
the Court stated:
We deal . . .with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruit-
less, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essen-
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes
of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of
complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
weU-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is
the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legisla-
tion ....
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is
or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive.'9 (Emphasis added.)
The reasoning of the Berman case has been followed in numerous
decisions including Grisanti v. City of Cleveland,"0 appeal of which has
James Metzenbaum, noted Cleveland attorney and author of the well known text MEmzxE-
BAUM, LAw or ZoNwG (1955). The Ambler Realty Company was represented by the
Hon. Newton D. Baker, an outstanding authority on constitutional law and Secretary of
War under President Wilson.
17. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Star. 790, D.C. CODE ANN.
5§ 5-701-19 (1961).
19. 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1959).
20. Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 181 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), affirming 179
N.E.2d 798 (Ohio C.P. 1961), appeal dismissed, 173 Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 83 Sup. Ct. 111 (1962).
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
recently been dismissed by the United States Supreme Court because it
presented no substantial federal question. The issues in Grisanti were
essentially the same as those raised in Berman, namely, the validity of
designating the property owner's land as "blighted," and the taking of
private land for a public purpose, the land to be developed by a private
developer. In unanimously dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court
indicated, by implication, that the City Council of Cleveland, Ohio, a
charter municipality, has the same authority to determine the need for
urban redevelopment within its jurisdiction as does the United States
Congress over the District of Columbia.2
Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and to ap-
propriate private property to some particular public use; but this right
can only be exercised if reasonable compensation is paid for the taking.
However, the concepts of police power and eminent domain have become
so entwined in cases like Berman that the question may well be raised:
"Have the cases now reached the point of merger of the police and
eminent domain powers?,
22
In the Hunter case, the eminent domain power to carry out redevelop-
ment was not utilized. The city contended that the enactment of the
stopgap resolution was merely to implement the Community Redevelop-
ment Law of the State of California,' under which it was operating. The
resolution was an exercise of the city council's police power not accom-
panied by compensation. The facts are, therefore, distinguishable from
those in Berman, a case cited by the California appellate court to uphold
the use of the police power by the city council. In Berman and Grisanti,
the municipal authorities stood ready to appropriate the land under
eminent domain and to pay the constitutionally required compensation.
The court in Hunter held that since "community redevelopment pro-
grams need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis
lot by lot, building by building,"24 the city council's stopgap resolution
protecting the nascent municipal urban renewal plan should be effective.
The resulting injury to the property owner who was denied a permit to
build and, thereby, the beneficial use of his property, was justified by
the court as being reasonably necessary for the public good. The rule
the court stated is:
If the injury is the result of legitimate governmental action reason-
ably taken for the public good and for no other purpose, and is reason-
21. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
22. HAAR,LANDUSE PLANNING410 (1959).
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33000-985.
24. 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 520 (1960).
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ably necessary to serve a public purpose for the general welfare, it is a
proper exercise of the police power to permit the taking or damaging
of private property without compensation.25
Stopgap measures are unlike usual zoning legislation because of the
failure to follow customary procedure in their enactment. Further, their
enactment and effect are unlike that of condemnation ordinances under
the right of eminent domain because of this same alteration of legislative
procedure, and the absence of reasonable compensation.
It is dear that many municipalities will wish to protect their nascent
comprehensive land use programs by enacting stopgap legislation, an
expression of the police power authority. Such legislation, if properly
enacted, may preserve the plan until the later stages when the property
is ready to be taken under eminent domain.
REASONS STOPGAP MEASURES HAVE BEEN HELD INvALiD
Failure to Follow Mandatory Procedure
Temporary or stopgap zoning ordinances and resolutions have been
held invalid where not enacted in compliance with the constitutional or
statutory provisions authorizing municipalities to enact zoning ordi-
nances.
26
Home Rule Jurisdictions
The authority of an Ohio municipality to exercise the police power in
the form of zoning ordinances stems from article XVIII, section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution which provides:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general law.
This home rule provision is self-executing with respect to zoning regula-
tions and, therefore, requires no enabling statutes to give municipalities
the power to enact zoning laws.2"
The statutory law of Ohio provides that mtinicipalities may zone,2"
and sets forth the procedure to follow in enacting such legislation.29 But
an Ohio municipality operating under a charter has unrestricted power
in the area of zoning."0
25. Id. at 523.
26. See Annor., 136 A.L.R. 844, 850 (1942).
27. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
28. OM-o REv. CODE 5 713.06.
29. Omo Ri.m CODE § 713.12.
30. Baumaa v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St. 269, 171 N.E. 336 (1930) (inter-
preting what is now OHIO REv. CODE § 713.14).
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The Ohio constitution gives municipalities the power to adopt police
regulations "not in conflict with general law," and the statutory law
authorizes unrestricted powers regarding zoning if provided for in a
municipal charter. It is clear that the effect of this is to give Ohio
charter municipalities twin authority to exercise full zoning powers. The
power of charter municipalties is limited only when municipal ordinances
conflict with substantive zoning regulations of a general application
enacted by the state legislature.
Despite this broad authority of charter municipalities, procedural
difficulties have arisen where the municipal charter provides that state
law be followed.
In State ex rel. Fairmount Center Company v. Arnold3 the muni-
cipal charter of the city of Shaker Heights, Ohio, provided that, except
where a contrary intent appeared in the charter or in the actions of the
council, the powers of the city may be exercised in such manner as may
be provided in the general law. The court held that since there was no
contrary intent in either the charter or in the enactments of the council,
the state law requiring a public hearing on a zoning ordinance must be
followed. An emergency stopgap ordinance depriving a property owner
who complied with present zoning ordinances of his right to a building
permit was therefore invalidated for failure of the council to follow the
required state statutory procedure.
Non-Home Rule Jurisdictions
In states where the right to exercise the police power is not granted
to the municipality in the state constitution, the municipality derives
whatever authority it may have from state statutes. Such statutes will
usually be strictly construed since "any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt
concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the
[municipall corporation, and the power is denied., 32
In Downey v. City of Sioux City3 the city claimed that it had passed
an emergency ordinance to protect a nascent general plan for zoning.
The Iowa Supreme Court denied the validity of the ordinance since no
express delegation of the right to enact such legislation was granted by
state statute. The court distinguished the California case of Miller v.
Board of Public Works, 4 pointing out that the source of police power in
California municipalities is derived from that state's constitution and the
31. 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941). See also Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St.
447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954).
32. 1 DILLION, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
33. 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929).
34. 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925). This case was relied on in Hunter v. Adams, 180
Cal. App. 2d 511 (1960).
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power which it grants is "as broad as that possessed by the Legislature
itself, except that it must be confined to local affairs."
Much as it might serve the public welfare to protect a proposed muni-
cipal zoning or urban renewal plan, the procedure set forth in the en-
abling statute of the state must be followed by the municipality in pass-
ing its stopgap measures. Sometimes there is no authority at all to pass
such measures.
In State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz5 an interim ordinance was in-
validated because, regardless of the real or supposed practical needs of
the municipality or its inhabitants in protecting contemplated zoning
legislation, the dearly expressed and mandatory provisions of the en-
abling statute could not, the court said, be abrogated, ignored, or relaxed.
The council had passed the "freeze" ordinance designed to preserve
the status quo without receiving a final report of the zoning or planning
commission, and without a public hearing or a provision for a board of
adjustment as required by the statute. The court reasoned that the munic-
ipality's use of the police power must conform to the terms of the grant
of that authority from the state legislature.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the state en-
abling statute did not carry with it implied or inherent power authorizing
the City of Harrisburg to pass an interim zoning ordinance."8 While
there are decisions to the contrary,3" the cases strictly construing enabling
legislation appear to be in the majority.3 8
Retroactive Legislation
One of the strongest arguments against the validity of interim or
stopgap measures in zoning is that zoning ordinances are put into effect
which have not been properly enacted. As a general rule, the restrictions
of a zoning ordinance or regulation may only be prospective."m The is-
sue necessarily entails the problem of nonconforming uses and the "vest-
ing of rights" prior to the enactment of permanent zoning law. A use
35. 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
36. Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949). In this case the city
had progressed to approximately the same stage of development as had the city in Hunter v.
Adams, supra note 12.
37. E.g., McCurley v. City of El Reno, 138 Okla. 92, 280 Pac. 467 (1929). The require-
ment for a hearing was held to mean for permanent comprehensive zoning only, and not for
a temporary ordinance.
38. E.g., National Transp. Co. v. Toquer, 123 Conn. 468, 196 Ad. 344 (1937); Downey
v. City of Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); Whittemore v. Town Clerk of
Falmouth, 299 Mass. 64, 12 N.E.2d 187 (1937); State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo.
932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935); State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St.
259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941); State ex rel. Castle National, Inc. v. Village of Wickliffe, 80
N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947). See also Annot., 136 AI..R. 844, 890 (1942), and 1
DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
39. 101 CJ.. Zoning § 38 (1958).
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of property in existence on the effective date of a municipal zoning ordi-
nance, which use does not comply with that ordinance, is called a noncon-
forming use.
4 °
Despite their retroactive effect, stopgap or interim ordinances have
been held valid in California since Miller v. Board of Public Works41
was decided in 1925. The courts in Ohio, on the other hand, will not
allow a municipality to refuse a permit merely because the proposed use
of property by its owner does not conform to pending legislation.
Attempts have been made to freeze the issuance of building permits
even when it is unknown whether the proposed legislation would be in-
terfered with if the permit were to be issued. For example, in Bassichis
v. Guion,4" the relator, whose plans conformed to the present zoning laws,
was denied a building permit on the basis of an administrative order made
more than one month before a freeze ordinance was enacted by the city
council. In its brief the relator argued:
The Respondents refusal to issue the building permit to the Relators is
based upon the argument that the proposed building will be located in
an area which is under study as an urban renewal area by the City of
Cleveland, and if the building is erected, it may not conform to the
urban renewal plan which is presently being formulated for this area,
and which, when completed, may or may not be adopted by the Council
of the City of Cleveland. The uncertainties which confront the Relators
in the present use of their properties is apparent from the above state-
ment.
The court of appeals issued the writ of mandamus compelling the build-
ing commissioner to issue the permit.
In Hauser v. State ex rel. Erdman" the council of the City of Cincin-
nati, on January 15, 1924, adopted a resolution directing the commis-
sioner of buildings to refuse a permit for the erection of a building until
the council had acted upon a building and zoning ordinance then pending
before it. Relator's application was not formally filed until January 31,
1924, although it had been presented to the commissioner prior to June
2, 1923. The ordinance, which was eventually passed by the council,
did not become effective until May 4, 1924, more than three months
40. For a discussion of whether a building permit alone, or a building permit plus sub-
stantial investment and actual use is needed to establish a nonconforming use, see Young,
The Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 W. RES. L. REv. 681, 687 (1961).
41. 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925). This case was relied upon by the court in Hunter
v. Adams, note 12 supra.
42. See Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960; State ex rel.
Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777); State ex rel.
Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 166 N.E. 228 (1929); Hauser v. State
ex rel. Erdman, 113 Ohio St. 662, 150 N.E. 42 (1925).
43. No. 25386, Ohio Ct. App., Jan. 16, 1961.
44. 113 Ohio St. 662, 150 N.E. 42 (1925).
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after relator filed his application. The Ohio Supreme Court granted
relator's prayer for mandamus, " stating:
He [relator] had fully complied with the state and city building codes
when he filed his application for a permit, and there seems to have been
no reason why it was refused other than the insistance that a zoning
ordinance was pending at the time.4 6.
Although State ex rel. Fairmount Center Company v. Arnold" was
decided primarily on the issue that a stopgap ordinance was enacted
contrary to the required statutory procedure, the court also implied
that article II, section 28 of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the
Ohio General Assembly from enacting any retroactive law, might also
apply to municipal legislative bodies.4 If such were not the case, the
broad powers granted to Ohio municipalities under the home rule amend-
ment49 would be greater than those granted to the state." Paragraph
one of the syllabus states:
A municipal council may not, by the enactment of an emergency ordinance,
give retroactive effect to a pending zoning ordinance thus depriving a
property owner of his right to a building permit in accordance with a
zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application for such
permit.B1
The Fairmount decision was followed by the court in Gibson v. City
of Oberlin.5" The property owner applied for a permit to build an apart-
ment house in conformity with the ordinances in effect at the time of the
application. Upon being refused the permit by the building inspector,
the property owner appealed to the Board of Appeals which reversed the
building inspector and ordered the permit to be issued. An appeal was
prosecuted from this order to the Oberlin City Council which reversed
the ruling of the Board of Appeals. While the property owner's appeal
before the court of common pleas was pending, the council amended the
zoning ordinances, thereby making the building of apartment houses
illegal. Reversing the decision of the court of appeals which had reversed
the common pleas court, and, following the Fairmount and Hauser cases,
45. Kirschke v. City of Houston, 330 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), appeal dismissed,
364 U.S. 474 (1960), illustrates that a petitioner should use care to seek a writ of mandamus
rather than damages. Here, the municipality was not liable for damages even though it
wrongfully appropriated plaintiff's property. The issuance of a permit or license was held
to be a governmental function for which the municipality was not liable.
46. Hauser v. State ex rel. Erdman, 113 Ohio St. 662, 667, 150 N.E. 42, 43 (1925).
47. 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.F-2d 777 (1941).
48. See Note, 34 NoTIR DAMB LAw. 109, 113 (1958).
49. OHIO CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 3.
50. But see, Williams v. Village of Deer Park, 78 Ohio App. 231, 69 N.E.2d 536 (1946),
where a later enacted zoning ordinance was given effect.
51. State exrel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259,34 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
52. 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960).
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the Ohio Supreme Court held that the council could not give retroactive
effect to a zoning ordinance, and the permit must be issued. The court
of appeals had held that the law in existence at the time of the suit
controlled.
"Vested Rights" Theory
Another reason why Hunter v. Adams58 may not be persuasive au-
thority in some jurisdictions is because of decisions holding that an appli-
cant's right to a building permit becomes vested at the time the applica-
tion is filed, and that his right to the permit must be decided on the basis
of the zoning laws then in effect.54 Ohio, for example, in supporting
the "vested rights" theory, is diametrically opposed to the California law
on this issue.5
In Gibson v. City of Oberlin Justice Matthias stated that while a
property owner has no vested right in the continuance of any particular
regulation, once the regulations have been established and are in force,
the state and its subdivisions are as much bound to abide by them as the
people. Since the applicant had complied with all the requirements for
the permit, he had a right to it. Justice Matthias wrote:
Subsequent legislation enacted pending applicant's attempted enforce-
ment of such right through administrative or legal channels cannot
deprive him of the right. The right became vested, under the law ap-
plicable thereto, upon the filing of the application for the permit.5
Contrast this statement with one by the California Supreme Court in a
1934 decision: 57
The rights of the parties are to be determined as of the present time
rather than the time of the application for a permit. By its application
for a permit before the zoning ordinance was passed, respondent com-
pany secured no vested right to the same.5 "
The California rule, it should be noted, expresses the prevailing view.59
Speculative Purpose for Freeze
A reasonable period of time has usually been allowed to municipali-
ties by the courts to plan comprehensive zoning measures.6" Since urban
53. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 584 (1947).
55. See cases cited supra note 42.
56. Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 5, 167 N.E.2d 651, 654 (1960).
57. Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672 (1934). See also
Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 Pac. 487 (1928).
58. Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 91, 33 P.2d 672, 674 (1934).
59. Annot., 169 A.L.R. 584 (1947). See also A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensing-
ton, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954).
60. Butvinik v. Jersey City, 6 N.J. Misc. 803, 142 Ad. 759 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
[Vol 14: 1
Stopgap Measures
renewal programs also require planning and the expenditure of millions
of dollars of public funds, it is logical to assume that the same rule will
hold true. Of course, what is considered a "reasonable period" will vary
with the facts of each case. The landowner who would like to use his
property by legally conforming to existing requirements of zoning and
building should not be indefinitely deprived of his property rights by
stopgap legislation.
It appears that the diligence and speed with which a municipality is
progressing with its zoning or urban renewal program will influence the
courts in deciding whether to allow temporary protection of the status
quo for the planned area.
In Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Village of Palatine6' where
the proposed ordinance was on file and open to public inspection, and
hearings had been held on it, the court held that the city could wait for
a "reasonable" length of time before acting on an application for a build-
ing permit which conformed to the zoning laws in effect at the time of
the application, but which did not conform to the proposed ordinance.
The duty of a municipality to refrain from tying up property for mere
speculative purposes is illustrated in Henle v. City of Euclid. 2 The prop-
erty owner complied with all the requirements necessary to have the zon-
ing law changed so that she could use her property for a gasoline filling
station. The city frustrated her efforts claiming that the property might
be needed for a freeway. In a strong opinion, the court of appeals indi-
cated that the planning had not developed to a point where the city could
tie up the plaintiff's use of her property. The court declared:
The claim that the city has the right to 'freeze' plaintiff's property,
preventing her from its beneficial use until the city gets around to
appropriating it for public purposes as a part of the Lakeland Freeway,
is without foundation. If the city needs the property in that develop-
ment then an immediate proceeding in eminent domain would end this
lawsuit. All that has been done so far toward building the Lakeland
Freeway is tentative in character. The proceeding looking to the con-
struction of the freeway has not reached a stage compelling the city to
appropriate the property, nor is the plaintiff compelled to stand by, pay-
ing taxes without benefit, until the development reaches a stage, if it
ever does, where her property must be taken for freeway purposes.t6
In a subsequent decision 4 stemming from the Henle case, the Ohio
Supreme Court pointed out that when the proposed improvement is still
in a "visionary stage awaiting a co-operation agreement with the county,
61. 22 I1M. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959). But see Lido Links Homes v. Young,
13 Misc. 2d 157, 176 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1956), where the plan for a highway was
already in existence.
62. 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E.2d 682 (1954).
63. Id. at 264, 118 N.E.2d at 685-86 (1954).
64. State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336 (1955).
19621
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
state or federal government," 5 the municipality can not appropriate the
property 6 These two cases appear to have meaningful implications for
future urban renewal litigation. They indicate that a municipality should
not attempt to restrict the use of land by stopgap measures when the plan
which is sought to be protected has only a fledgling existence.
The city attempting to control land use pending the adoption of a
plan is often in the position of not knowing until it actually receives the
plan whether particular property will have to be acquired for the public
need. In State ex rel. Dille Laboratories Corporation v. Woditsch67 prepa-
rations had progressed to the point where the city expected to receive the
plan within two or three weeks from the date set for litigation. In up-
holding the right of the petitioner to a writ of mandamus for a building
permit, the court pointed out that a property owner cannot be expected to
refrain from embarking on his plans until others have completed theirs.
A municipality has no power or authority to appropriate lands for some
contemplated future use,"8 and, if stopgap measures fail, the municipality
will find difficulty in exercising any control over the use of property
which otherwise complies with present laws.
CONCLUSION
Protecting a property owner who wishes to acquire a building permit
to build a structure that would be inferior under the proposed legislation,
or who has no intention of using the permit except as a device for bar-
gaining when his land is finally appropriated, does not seem proper. On
the other hand, there are those who desire to use their property in a so-
cially desirable way, conforming to present laws and perhaps even to the
proposed ones, but who would be forced to give up their property rights
to the state police power if interim legislation were held valid.
The community's power to protect itself is often hamstrung by the
slow process of enacting ordinances, coupled with the court's antipathy
for retroactive legislation. The most desirable solution might be to allow
interim legislation when there is a sufficient showing that the adoption of
a permanent zoning ordinance or urban renewal plan is imminent, but
to set a statutory time limit after which the stopgap measure would be-
come invalid. This solution would soften opposition to stopgap legisla-
tion by assuring that the use of property will not be restricted for mere
speculative purposes.
ALAN V. FRIEDMAN
65. Id. at 272, 130 N.E.2d at 340.
66. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448 (1930). Even though a master
plan has been adopted there are still many indefinite aspects to the program. See HAAR,
The Master Plan: An Inquiry in Dialogue Form, in LAND-UsE PLANNING 730 (1959).
67. 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d 164 (1958).
68. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
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